On May 27, 2011, nearly two years after the Paris bound flight crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, French accident investigators released information from the newly recovered "black boxes" that reignited old controversies. Is pilot skill and technique or advanced computer technology the most important aspect incorporated into modern airline design and training?
The Crash
Nearly four hours after departing Rio de Janeiro, Air France flight AF447 (an Airbus A-330-203) plunged 38,000 feet into the Atlantic Ocean killing 228 people. Flight data and cockpit voice recorder information released on May 27, 2011 by the French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) indicate seven significant points.
- The young First Officer (37) and IRO (32)** were at the controls of the aircraft at the time of the accident; however, the captain did enter the cockpit prior to impact.
- The captain was aware of a potential temperature problem as the aircraft flew through a high altitude cloud layer.
- There was ice accumulation, caused by super-cooled warm water vapor, rapidly carried to altitude by the updrafts from the thunderstorms the aircraft was overflying.
- This massive amount of moisture cause the heated pitot tubes to ice over and provide airspeed discrepancies for less than one minute to the co-pilots.
- The first officers seemingly did not understand the meteorological condition they encountered and incorrectly changed the pitch attitude of the aircraft, which caused it to climb and lose airspeed.
- Flight 447 stalled and the co-pilots apparently were untrained in recognition and recovery techniques.
- The airplane plunged 38,000 feet in 210 seconds killing all 228 aboard.
Experience
This crew was, by government and media standards, experienced. According to James Sturcke of UK's The Guardian on June 1, 2009, Captain Marc Dubois had 11,000 total flight hours (1,700 on the Airbus series) and the first officers had 3,000 and 6,600 flight hours respectively (800 and 2,600 on the Airbus series). Nevertheless, the flight data recorder indicated, the cockpit voice recorder orated, BEA affirmed and seasoned pilots recognize that Air France 447 entered what is called a classic deep (or secondary) stall.
The Controversy
This tragedy reignites the long standing controversy over two fundamental principles: technological protection verses individual recognition and recovery.
Technology - advocates believe automation improves safety and the Airbus 330 is one of the most advanced aircraft flying. Investigative journalist and pilot Peter Berendsen wrote in the May 2011 issue of Professional Pilot Magazine, "Airbus engineers believe in cockpit automation, since they have to sell their aircraft to a fast-growing worldwide market with limited supplies of qualified and experienced pilots."
The A-330 is a fly-by-wire aircraft, meaning the pilot does not directly control the aircraft but enters instructions into computers. The CPUs interpret these pilot inputs and manipulate the flight controls as requested. In normal operation (called Normal Law) the computer restricts the pilot from entering unsafe information. However, in cases where computers fail Alternate Law leaves the pilots vulnerable without certain protections. In these situations the pilot can stall the airplane as happened in AF 447.
Technique - advocates believe pilots must always be aviators and until the late 1980s every airline simulator training session began with a skills review of basic airmanship. However, with the advent of advanced computer technology (like the Airbus), there has been a flow away from aeronautical skills toward becoming system managers. Today's pilots are rarely taught the rudimentary aspects of flight, such as steep turns, stall recovery and unusual attitudes, in large airliner aircraft.
Conclusion
Seasoned pilots and investigators believe these fundamental skills can never be engineered and designed. They believe these skills require repetition to become natural and are always necessary for safe flights ultimately controlled by airline pilots. With the advent of new training programs, dictated by aircraft manufacturers like Airbus and approved by government agencies, pilots saw these skills programs disappear. Aviation consultant and former Braniff Airlines pilot John Nance told Lisa Stark of ABC News on May 27, 2011 "...in reality, it comes down to training. What we have here is a major training issue, training and proficiency," Nance argued.
On the PBS program "NOVA: Crash of Flight 447," broadcast several times during 2010 on WGBH TV, another seasoned accident investigator and former US Airways pilot Captain John Cox asked the rhetorical question, "Was this crew one that was...very slow to pick up the unusual [attitude] information,"
Veteran air accident expert Tony Cable, who investigated the Concorde crash (Air France 4590) and Pan Am 103 (the 1988 Lockerbie bombing) criticizes technology on the same PBS program. According to Cable, the computerized airplanes have "raised the question whether the situation is actually being made worse by the increase in automation whereby crews don't get a great deal of opportunity to manually fly the aircraft."
Unfortunately, BEA results indicate that these were the skill sets needed by the young pilots flying AF447. Captain Nance put it best when he argued "I would think one of the major points that has to come out of this [accident] is that pilots -- not just at Air France, but all over the planet -- need to be massively trained."
*PI = pilot induced
**An IRO (International Relief Officer or Cruise Pilot) is another First Officer (or co-pilot)s
Frank W. Hardy - Frank has 36 years of airline experience navigating every ocean & continent. Flying 25,000 hours in 42 years presents a rare historical ...
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